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International Institute for Applied Systems ~ n a l ~ s i s '  
Unlike resources found in nature, technology is a manmade resource whose 
abundance can be continuously increased, and whose importance in determining 
the world's future is also increasing. [C. Starr and R. Rudman, 19731 
Abstract 
Diffusion phenomena are identified to be at the heart of processes of 
technological, economic and social change. Patterns, regularities and timing of 
diffusion processes are illustrated on basis of selected examples. A metaanalysis 
of a larger sample of diffusion processes for the USA identifies rates of change 
and their historical discontinuities. -The paper concludes in emphasizing the 
interlinkages within whole families of technologies and forms of social techniques 
(technology clusters). Historically, these have been instrumental in raising 
productivity and also alleviating many adverse enviror~mental impacts. The 
emergence of a new cluster could hold promise for an environmentally more 
compatible technological trajectory leading to further dematerialization and 
decarbonization of our economies. 
'paper presented at the Workshop on Technological Trajectories and the Environment, 
Rockefeller University, New York, October 28-29, 1993. 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss dynamics of processes of social, 
economic and technological change taking an inductive and empirical approach. 
Technology is seen as the principal dynamic force mediating between 
hurnan activities and ,the environment. Technology however, is interpreted in a 
larger sense, referring to whole socio-technical systems of production and use, 
enabling humans to extend their capabilities and to accomplish tasks which they 
could not perform otherwise. 
In the most narrow terms, technology is represented by man-made objects, 
referred to by engineers as "hardware" and by anthropologists as "artifacts". But 
technology does not end here. Artifacts have to be produced, i.e., invented, 
designed, and manufactured. This requires a larger system: hardware 
(machinery, a manufacturing plant), factor inputs (labor, energy, raw materials) 
and finally "software" (know-how, human knowledge and skills). The latter (for 
which the French use the term technique) represents the disembodied nature of 
technology (its knowledge base). Finally, technique is not only required for the 
production of given artifacts but also for their use (e.g., the technique of driving 
a car or u s i ~ g  a bank account), both at the level of the individual, as well as at 
the level of society. Forms of organization (like the existence of markets), 
institutions, social norms and attitudes are important to understand how particular 
systems of production and use of artifacts emerge and function. They are also 
important determinants for the origin and choice (selection) mechanisms of 
particular (ccmbinations of) artifacts, and the rate by which they become 
incorporated (or not incorporated) into a given socio-economic setting. A process 
referred to as technology diffusion. 
What then, is technological change? First, it is important to emphasize that 
technology evolution is cumulative, i.e., changes build on previous experiences 
and developments. Artifacts become obsolescent, however, the knowledge base 
developed for their production and use persists, being available for both the 
reproduction of existing and for the development of new solutions (innovations). 
But changes are not instantaneous. They require considerable time between 
development, first implementation, and widespread replication. Following 
Schumpeter we can distinguish between invention, innovation, and finally, 
diffusion. Invention is the first demonstration of the principal feasibility of a 
proposed new solution. Fermi's Chicago reactor demonstrated the feasibility of 
a controlled nuclear fission reaction (invention). 1957, 15 years later to the day 
after ,the inauguration of Fermi's pile, the Shipping Port reactor went into 
operation (innovation). And it took over 30 years after that date for nuclear 
reactors to account for some 20 percent of the electricity generated in the USA, 
with the prospects of further diffusion highly uncertain. Earl Pemberton in his 
classic 1936 article on "the curve of culture diffusion rate" provides other 
examples. The first country to introduce postage stamps was England in 1840 
(innovation), and it took close to 50 years for a sample of 37 independent 
European and (North and South) American countries to follow suit. The first 
compulsory school law at the state level in the USA was enacted in 1847. 
However, it took until 1927 for the last (southern) state to adopt a similar 
legislation. These illustrative examples already indicate that changes in 
technologies and social techniques are not one-time discrete events, but rather 
a process characterized by time lags and considerable time involved in diffusion. 
Inventive and innovative activities can provide potentials for change. 
However, it is only through diffusion that these potentials become actually 
translated into changes of social practices, artifacts and infrastr~~ctures in use. As 
such diffusion plienomena are at the heart of changes in society and the material 
structures (infrastructures and artifacts) it manifests itself. That is why in the 
subsequent discussion diffusion analysis provides the central metric to analyze 
the dynamics of processes of social and technological change. 
Diffusion: Social Actors and Networks 
To discuss some of the salient features of diffusion let us leave the field of 
technology and return to the 11th century A.D. The reform movement of 
Benedictian rule by St. Bernard led in 1098 to the foundation of Citeaux (Cluny), 
which was to become the mo.ther house of some 740 Cistercian monasteries. 
About eighty percent of them were founded in the first 100 years of the Cistercian 
movement and close to half of the total foundations occurring between 11 25 and 
1155 (Figure 1). -The .time path of the spread of Cistercian rule is non-linear and 
not unlike the diffusion patterns we observe for technological systems (cf. 
examples below). -The temporal diffusion pattern is almost invariant across 
cultures, across cultural traits, or artifacts: slow growth at the beginning, followed 
by accelerating and ,then decelerating growth, leading into saturation (and 
eventual decline). 
The role of social networks, and diversity is exempli,l.ied by the 
differentiation into different "sub-families" (named after their respective 
motherhouses, each of whom follows their own pattern of settlements,* regional 
specialization, and implenientation of Cistercian rule. Some of the additions to 
Cistercian rule were not genuine new settlements, but "takeovers", as yet another 
illustration of the social interactions involved in diffusion: Savigny (with all its 
daughterhouses) subrr~itted to Clairvaux rule in 1147, in turn to become the 
motherhouse of all Cistercian settlements on the British Isles. Despite 
differentiation and regional specialization, close comm~~nication existed between 
all of the monasteries, representing an important channel for the spread of 
innovations like the watermill or new agricultural practices introduced in the 13th 
and 14th century. 
Diffusion is both a temporal and spatial phenomenon. The topology of the 
Cistercian network clearly reveals a hierarchy of centers of creation and 
structured channels of spread (cf. Figure 2 illustrating the spread of two 
Cistercian "sub-families"). The patterns bear witness to the existence of networks. 
In fact, there is a growing literature3 emphasizing in particular the role social and 
spatial networks and the interactions they support, play in the diffusion process. 
Another feature emerging from Figure 2 are the significant differences in the 
spatial density of settlements. The innovation origin, Burgundy was home to all 
of the four mother houses and hosted the highest spatial concentration of 
settlements. From there daughterhouses were founded (regional sub-innovation 
centers in the terminology of spatial diffusion), from where Cistercians spread out 
further to the respective hinterlands (neighborhood effect in spatial diffusion) and 
to other sub-re!:!ht1a! centers, being in turn origin of further settlements. However, 
the density of settlements decreases further out to the periphery, i.e., away from 
innovation centers, implying persistent regional differences and disparities. This 
is not a unique feature of the diffusion process discussed here, but also applies 
2~ccording to Cistercian rule, settlements were to be located in remote, undeveloped 
areas. Thus, Cistercian monasteries were important local nodes for internal colonization (and of 
deforestation) in 13th and 14th century Europe. 
3 ~ f .  HAgerstrand, 1968, and Rogers, 1983 for an overview of spatial and temporal 
diffusion. For a more recent overview of diffusion theory cf. Nakicenovic and Grubler, 1991. On 
the role of networks, cf. e.g., Kamann and Nijkamp, 1991. 
to the spread of technological artifacts and infrastructure networks as illustrated 
in Figure 3 for the development of the railway network in the USA. 
Some Regularities of Diffusion 
The above example, deliberately chosen from a field outside technology, 
illustrates some regularities of diffusion processes which can be derived from 
both theoretical and empirical streams of diffusion research (summarized in 
Figure 4). 
(1) No innovation spreads instantaneously. Instead, a typical S-shaped 
terr~poral pattern seenis to be the rule. This basic pattern appears 
invariant, although the regularity and timing of diffusion processes 
vary greatly. 
(2) Diffusion is both a temporal and spatial phenomenon. Originating 
from innovation centers, a particular idea, practice, or artifact, 
spreads out further to their respective hinterlands (core area) and 
via a hierarchy of sub-innovation centers into the periphery (defined 
either spatially or functionally/socially). 
(3) The periphery, wliile starting adoption later, profits from external 
learning and the experience gained in the core and generally has 
faster adoption rates, i.e., is "catching-up". As the development time 
is shorter, however, the absolute adoption intensity is lower than in 
innovation centers or in core areas in (spatial or functional) 
proximity to them. 
(4) As a result, despite that, diffusion is essentially a process of 
homogenization, application densities, (spatial and intensity of use) 
and timing of diffusion remain heterogeneous, in space, among the 
poprrration of potential adopters, across different social strata. Thus, 
there is little theoretical or empirical evidence to assume that 
adoption intensities of early diffusion starters are any guide to the 
adoption levels of late followers. 
Diffusion: Spread in a Turbulent and Changing Environment 
Before discussing .further diffusion examples, let us return to the process prior to 
diffusion: innovation generation and selection. In fact, a realistic history of social 
and technological innovations would consist mostly of "non-starters", i.e., 
examples of no diffusion rather than diffusion. Thus, the existence of one (or a 
range) of possible innovations in itself is no guarantee for subsequent diffusion. 
To appreciate the uncertainty in the early phases of technology 
development let us look at a historical problem of technological hazard and 
environmental pollution from steam railways. Smoke sparks from woodburning 
steam locomotives in the USA represented a considerable fire hazard to both 
human settlements and forests. Over 1000 patents on "smoke-spark arresters'' 
were registered in the 19th century (some illustrated in Figure 5) in a futile search 
of a solution (to be solved finally not via an "add-on" technology, but by the 
replacement of steam by diesel and electric locomotives). This large variety of 
possible alternatives illustrates that diversity and experimentatio~i are precursors 
to diffusion. "Many are called, but few are ~ h o s e n . " ~  
An additional factor that can ir~fluence diffusion is resistance and 
opposition to change. Opposition to new proposed technologies is a recurrent 
historical phenomenon from the early railways to the opposition to the introd~~ction 
0.1 mechar~ical thresl-ling machines in rural England in the 1830s (in fact again a 
diffusion process as shown in Figure 6, the speed of which [two weeks], 
illustrates that social interaction and communication have been quite effective 
even in absence of modern transport and communication technologies). While 
possible opposition is source of uncertainty, it fulfills two important roles in the 
context of technology evolution: first it can operate as effective selection 
mechanism against socially unsustainable solutions, rejecting technologies, or, 
second, it is an important driving force for qualifying technologies to respond to 
societal concerns, improving its performance and thus enabling further diffusion. 
Even in a case of successful diffusion, the driving forces and factors 
determining speed and extent of diffusion5 are very heterogeneous, and in 
addition change over timc. It is important however to emphasize that ordered 
str~~ct~,~red transition paths at the macro level appear driven rather than dissipated 
4 ~ h e  choice (selection) of a particular alternat~ve may not conform to ex ante or cx post 
defined optimality criteria. Sometimes selection of a particular alternative results from an 
accumulation of small random events, eventually leading into a "lock-in" into a particular 
configuration. Thereafter, positive feedback mechanisms yield increasing returns to adoption of 
the standardized alternative (for a model cf. Arthur, 1988). 
 or an overview from the fields of sociology and anthropology cf. Rogers, 1983. From 
economics, cf. Mansfield, 1961 and 1968. For industrial innovations, cf. Nasbeth and Ray, 1974, 
and Ray, 1989. 
by diversity and complex interactions at the micro level. Such diversity, according 
to recent theoretical findings6, appears almost as a prerequisite for diffusion. In 
addition to micro-sociological and economic factors there appear also more 
generic systemic factors at work influencing speed of change: like level of 
aggregation, or size of the system (cf. Grijbler, 1991), or whether diffusion entails 
creating an entirely new context or supplants already existing techniques and 
artifacts. 
Three Levels of Diffusion 
A taxonomy of diffusion processes can be developed by differentiating the 
environment in which diffusion processes operate. In the most "pure" case an 
idea, practice, or artifact represents such a radical departure from existing 
solutions 'that it creates so to speak its own niche through diffusion. More 
frequently however, a new solution does not evolve in a vacuum but interacts 
with existing practices, technologies, etc. This case is referred to as 
(technological) substitution, with varying degrees of interaction (one to one 
competition, or multiple substitution). This interaction is usually most visible by 
looking at relative (e.g., market) shares of competing alternatives rather than on 
absolute volumes.' 
Figure 7 illus,trates a diffusion case proper, showing the growth of the 
canal network in the 19th century USA. The empirical data are approximated by 
a symmetrical growth cure (a three parameter logistic8 in this case). The 
'cf. Dosi et a/., 1986, Silverberg et a/., 1988, and Silverberg, 1991. 
7~ frequent impact of diffusion is a "demand pull", i.e. the market volume grows 
significantly during the diffusion process. 
81n the form of 
y = f(t) = Kl(1 + e -b(t-6))  
where K denotes the asymptote (the saturation level), b denotes the growth or diffusion rate (the 
speed to the diffusion process), and to denotes the inflection point (at W2 where the growth rates 
are at their maximum) and wh'-t? st ! -~es to position the growth curve in time. A convenient 
notation for the diffusion speed (rate) is 
1 1 A t  = - log 81 = - 4.3944915 , 
b b 
indicating the time for the process to grow between 10 and 90 percent of the ultimate K. Another 
interpretation of At is the time required to grow from one to 50 percent of the saturation level. 
Because of the symmetry condition 2 At denotes the time required to grow from 1 to 99 percent 
of K. 
estimated asymptote of the diffusion processes is with some 4000 miles in good 
agreement with the historical maximum of canal leng,th operated of some 4053 
miles in 1851. The speed of diffusion, or the diffusion rate, has a At of 31 years, 
i.e the entire diffusion cycle spans some 60 years. The year of maximum growth 
occurred in the mid-1 830s (to = 1835). Thus, it took more than half a century to 
develop the canal network in the USA, with most of canal construction occurring 
within a period of 30 years. The canal network declined rapidly after having 
reached its maxinium size, due to vicious corr~petition ,from railways (cf. the 
discussion of technological substitution below). As Figure 8 (Nakicenovic, 1991) 
illustrates, also subsequent transport infrastructures evolved along a similar 
dynan-~ic pattern as in the case of canals. For better comparability, the different 
sizes of individual networks have been renormalized, although in absolute 
extension railways and surfaced road networks were one and two orders of 
magnitude larger respectively than canals at their maximum network length. 
Consequently the dynamics of growth of railway and surfaced road networks are 
also somewhat slower (At's of 55 and 64 years respectively). The importance of 
the successive development of transport infrastructures for the USA economy, 
even for nearly aspect of daily life, cannot be addressed here.g Here we just 
point to the close relationship between different infrastructures: railways and the 
telegraph evolved together as did road networks and the oil pipelines delivering 
the energy required for the cars on the roads. This illustrates the importance of 
technological interdependence and cross-enhancing, which requires to look at the 
diffusion of particular technologies/techniques not in isolation, but in a larger 
context (cf. discussion on "technology clusters" below). 
Figure 9 illustrates another dimension of diffusion processes: the case of 
technological substitution. This case illustrates the diffusion of a technological 
artifact (the passenger car), which grew by replacing another artifact (the riding 
horse and the carriage). Figure 9 shows the absol~lte numbers of draft animal? 
and cars in the USA, illustrating that the 20 million horses used for transport 
purposes practically disappeared from the roads within less than three decades. 
The model estimates shown in figure are derived from a (logistic) substitution 
curve fit indicating a dynamic of this replacement process with a At of 12 years 
 or an account of the dynamic interactions in US transport infrastructure development, 
cf. IVakicenovic, 1988. For a discussion of the impacts of transport infrastructure development on 
economic growth and discontinuities in economic development cf. Isard, 1942, Grubler, 1990, and 
Berry, 1993 (who also provides a good account of their impact on urbanization, cf. Berry, 1990). 
(cf. Nakicenovic, 1986). Figure 10, reporting on the diffusion of catalytic converter 
cars (At of 12 years) in the USA, i~lustrates'~ that the dynamics of the 
replacement of the road vehicle fleet have not changed since the horse area. The 
exarr~ple given in Figure 9 above illustrates yet another dynamic feature of 
technology evolution: growth beyond the initial field of application (i.e., a 
combination of substitution and diffusion proper). The car grew initially by 
replacing horses. However, after completion of that process in the 1930s, new 
markets opened, viz. were created: long-distance travel (competition to railways) 
and short-distance commuting that enabled the development of concomitant 
settlement patterns (suburbanization). Currently, some 143 million passenger cars 
are registered in the USA, or close to 0.6 cars per capita. Is this a likely guide for 
future mass-motorization globally? We do not think it is. Instead, the high density 
of cars in the USA is rather seen as result of specific initial conditions of high 
individual mobility even before the advent of the automobile and a long sustained 
period of diffusion, which created precisely those conditions in lifestyles, spatial 
division of labor, settlement patterns, of an "automobile society". 
Returning to the stylized exposition of the diffusion phenomenon (Figure 
4 above), let us analyze whether the diffusion of cars at a global scale is 
consistent with the theoretical propositions. As Figure 11 indicates, it is. Both the 
acceleration of diffusion rate of late adopters, as well as the declining adoption 
density as a function of introduction date (and shorter diffusion time) appear 
corroborated by empirical data. A conclusion supported also by an analysis of the 
declining adoption densities of "late-starters" in the railway development of the 
19th century (Grubler, 1990). Thus, heterogeneity in adoption levels are likely to 
persist, the more as with the possible development of new transport systems 
corresponding better to evolving concerns over functionality and environmental 
impacts, alternatives to the internal engine powered car would become available. 
Adopting this perspective laads to considerable lower transport energy demand 
scenarios than frequently assumed (Grubler et a/., 1992). 
1°~easuring market shares. The asymptote of the process (no technology can hold more 
than 100 percent market share) is known in this case. In addition, the non-linear diffusion function 
is presented in linear form. Hence, 
log (yl(l - y)) = b(t  - to) 
a transformation especially suited for a more detailed inspection of the (turbulent) introduction and 
saturation phases in technological diffusion/substitution. 
Finally, and in most cases also most realistic process of technological 
change, let us consider the case of multiple competing technologies," as done 
in Figure 12 for the process technology change in USA steel manufacture. Here 
as many as four technologies (with decreasing and increasing market shares) 
compete simultaneously on the market. The diffusion trajectories of all processes 
show also a high degree of diversity in their dynamics, ranging with At's below 
two decades (replacement of the crucible process) to nearly seven decades 
(diffusion of electric arc steel). These changes in process technology not only 
enabled significant expansion of production but were also highly significant from 
an enviror~mental perspective. They went along with structural changes in the 
energy supply mix in direction of higher (exergetic) quality and cleaner energy 
carriers (Figure 13), a trend consistent with the overall evolution of energy supply, 
as illustrated in Nakicenovic's contributio~i to this conference. As a result of these 
combined changes the energy intensity per ton of steel produced in the USA has 
declined by over a factor 10 over the last 100 years (cf. GrL~bler, 1990bIVasko). 
This particular exarr~ple clearly indicates the scale of historical trends towards 
dematerialization of energy use. A further result was a significant decline in the 
carbon intensity of USA steel manufacture (Figure 14), a decarbonization trend 
which follows a typical learning curve, despite minimizing carbon emissions were 
up to today not on the agenda of the industry. It is important to stress that these 
improvements were not result from isolated technological changes, but rather of 
a combination of both gradual, cumulative technology improvements and more 
radical structural changes in both fields of steel process technology and energy 
supply. These two structural change processes, operating in tandem are an 
illustration of the importance of interlinkages and interdependencies between 
different technological systems, a point discussed in the following chapter. 
Clusters and Families 
Technologies cannot be looked at in isolation, nor can they be separated from 
techniques for their production and use, and the overall socio-economic 
framework they are embedded in. We can distinguish four levels of changes in 
the technology base:12 (1) incremental improvements, (2) radical changes in 
 o or a model cf. Marchetti and NakiCenoviC, 1979. 
 or or a more detailed discussion cf. Freeman and Perez, 1988, and Griibler, 1992. 
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(individual) technologies and artifacts, (3) changes in technology systems 
(combinations of radical changes in technologies combined with organizational 
and managerial changes), and finally, (4) changes in whole clusters and families 
of technologies and in associated orgar~izational and institutional settings. It is 
these technology clusters, which in our interpretation represent the technological 
"trajectories", subject of this conference. As an example consider the 
development of the automotive industries which was contingent inter alia on 
developments in materials (high quality steel sheets), the chemical industries (oil 
refining, in particular catalytic cracking), production and supply infrastructures 
(exploration and oil production, pipelines and gasoline stations), development of 
public infrastructures (roads), and a host of other technological innovations. The 
growth of the industry was based on a new production organization (Fordist type 
of mass production combined with Tayloristic scientific management principles), 
yielding significant real-term cost reductions, which made the car affordable to a 
wider social strata, thus changing settlement patterns, consumption habits of the 
population, leisure activities, etc. In turn, the automobile is just one artifact 
among many consumer durables which now belongs as a "standard package" to 
every household in industrialized countries. Clusters of radical innovations and 
technology systems, interdependent and mutually cross-enhancing, give rise to 
whole "families" of technological innovations with associated new institutional and 
organizational settings. lnterlir~kages and multiplier effects are responsible for the 
pervasive impacts of such techno-institutional "clusters" on the economy and 
society. 
From a historical perspective we can identify four such "technology 
clusters" (and a spec~~lative merging fifth one). Figure 15 tabulates various 
phases of industrial and economic development through the concept of 
technology clusters. It lists the dominant cluster in the top row, and the emerging 
(dominating in the successive phase) below. Examples of key technologies in 
the areas of energy and transport systems, materials and industry, as well as in 
the final consumer sphere are listed. Finally, we summarize the dominant 
"organizational style", i.e., the predominant mode regulating industrial, economic 
and social relations, and give a geographical taxonomy of centers of 
industrialization (core) and regions catching-up (newly industrializing or "rim" 
countries). 
The four historical and the prospective fifth technology cluster sketched 
out in Figure 15 are nick-named a.fter their most important carrier branches or 
functioning principles. These are: the textile cluster, extending to the 1820s, the 
steam cluster until about the 1870s, heavy engineering, lasting until the eve of 
WW II, and mass productionlconsumption until the 1970s and 1980s. Currently 
we appear in the transition to a new age of industrial and economic development. 
Both its characterization as "total quality" (i.e., control of both the internal and 
external [environmental] quality of industrial production) cluster as well as the 
technological examples listed are necessarily speculative. 
Rates of Change 
In order to quantify the emergence of above discussed "technology clusters" an 
empirical analysis into the diffusion history of a larger sarr~ple of technologies and 
social techniques was performed for the USA (cf. Griibler, 1990, and 1991). This 
empirical analysis also serves as a data base to perform a "metaanalysis" of 
processes of charlge with respect to their dynamics. 
Consistent with the larger definition of "technology" adopted here, the 
examples used in the analysis were not only taken from the technological field 
alone. The empirical cases considered include the areas of energy, transport, 
manufac.turing, agriculture, consumer durables, communication, military, and 
finally, economic and social diffusion and structural change processes such as 
the diffusion of literacy, reduction of infant mortality, structural changes in 
employment, etc. Two samples were analyzed. The first sample consists of 11 7 
diffusion cases analyzed at I IASA'~. This sample is augmented by all the 
additional cases we were able to find in the literature with a quantification of 
diffusion parameters, bringing ,the sarnple size to a total of 265 innovation cases. 
Figure 16 shows the h~stogram of the diffusion rates as measured by their 
At's for the two samples. They range in duration from very short-term processes 
of only a few years to decades, even centuries. The mean value ranges between 
40 and 60 years with a standard deviation of about equal magnitude. The largest 
number of diffusion processes have A's in the order of between 15 to 30 
13cf. Marchetti and NakiCenoviC, 1979; Marchetti, 1980; NakiCenoviC, 1986; GrObler, 1990. 
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years,14 some of which we have given for illustrative purposes above (e.g., 
vehicle fleets or steel production methods). In general, At's appear to have a 
rank-size distribution. 
The histogram gives one kind of summary about the distribution of 
diffusion processes: at any period of time, change in a society can be 
decomposed into a large number of diffusion/substitution processes with a great 
variety in their A's. Another possible aggregate measure is the average diffusion 
rate over time for the whole socio-economic system. For this measure we 
calculate the average diffusion rates of our innovation samples i.e. the sum of the 
first derivatives of the diffusion/substitution trajectoriesI5 at any given point in 
time divided by the number of diffusion processes occurring at that moment. -This 
indicator is the diffusion equivalent to the annual GNP growth rate. The resulting 
average diffusion rate measures the changing average rate of technical, 
economic and social change at the country level: in our case the USA since 
1800. 
Figure 17 shows the average diffusion rate of 1 17 diffusion processes. It 
portrays clear peaks and troughs, indicating that the process of change is not 
gradual and linear but is instead characterized by pronounced discontinuities. 
The general increase in the average rate of change is not necessarily indicative 
because the closer we approach the present simply more shorter-term diffusion 
processes are documented. The increasing average rate of change could 
therefore a statistical artifact stemming from the bias in the sample in this 
direction. Although we take averages, the higher number of overlapping 
short-term processes in one interval could result in a higher aggregate diffusion 
rate. On the other hand, the rising average rates of change could also result from 
the cumulative nature of the process of technological change. Even though no 
individual diffusion process may proceed faster compared to the past, the number 
and variety of artifacts (particularly those with comparatively faster turnover raies) 
is much larger today than ever. This could result in an increase in the average 
rate of change. In other words, while no individual technology or artifact diffuses 
14starr and Ruman 1974, p. 360, suggested a doubling time of the technological 
component of economic growth of 20 to 30 years. An assumption which appears corroborated 
by our data sample. 
15~alculated from the parameters of a logistic diffusion/substitution function. In cases the 
empirical data did not support their approximation by this particular model, piecewise linear trends 
of the log(F/K-F) transform were used to model the empirical distribution. 
faster than in the past (under appropriate ceteris paribus conditions), .there are 
much more technologies and objects in use, and thus "more to change". 
Figure 17 represents just an aggregate rate of change over all diffusion 
processes, regardless of their social or economic importance. In a subsequent 
step we have developed a weighting measure, assuming that the importance of 
any particular process of diffusion or change is directly related to the time 
constant of diffusion. Thus, we assume that the longer a process takes, the more 
pervasive (important)16 its macro level effects. It is noteworthy that also this 
weighted average rate of socio-technical change reveals pronounced long-term 
discontinuities as shown in Figure 18. 
The discontinuities in the long-term rate of socio-technical change are the 
result of the complex coupled dynamics of the discontinuous rate innovations are 
introduced, and of the different rates of absorption (diffusion) of ,these innovations 
in the socio-economic system. Periods of accelerating technological and social 
diffusion rates indicate the emergence of a "technology cluster" under which a 
large number of interrelated innovations diffuse into the econorr~ic and social 
environment contributing, via backward and forward linkages, to prolonged 
periods of economic growth. These periods are followed by periods where 
progressively more and more innovations enter their saturation phase of diffusion. 
Thus, each peak in the average rate of change in Figures 17 and 18 
characterizes the start of saturation of a corresponding cluster or family of 
diffusion processes. This "season of saturations" results in a significant decline 
in the average rate of technical and social change and, via market saturation and 
a decrease in investments, also to a slowdown in economic growth. Presumably 
many innovations have emerged during the last decades that may turn out to be 
successful. If they were included they could perhaps lead to a trend reversal in 
the rate-of-change curve sometime after the mid-1990s, the time when these 
successful innovations, after a slow initial diffusion, would in turn enter into the 
exponential part of their diffusion life cycle. 
1 6 ~ h e  weighing measure proposed, links the importance of a particular diffusion process 
proportionally to its diffusion time constant At. Thus, a one percent growth in the railway network 
of the USA (At of 55 years), is assumed to be proportionally (55112) more important than a one 
percent growth in the diffusion of diesellelectric locomotives (replacing steam locomotives) 
proceeding with a At of 12 years. 
The conclusion on the discontinuous nature of socio-economic change is 
corroborated by analyzing the average diffusion rates of ,the second innovation 
sample comprising 265 innovation cases. Compared to the first sample, the 
greater preponderance of shorter term diffusion and substitution processes after 
the World War II period results in a shorter mean At of the sarr~ple (i.e. of the 
weighing measure). Therefore, also the weighted aggregate rate of change is 
higher than for the first sample (Figure 18). However, this does not necessarily 
mean that this larger sample of diffusion processes yields higher rates of overall 
socio-technical change, but rather that it is an indication of the better 
documentation of also shorter term diffusion processes the closer we approach 
the present. Still, pronounced discontinuities remain and also the larger sample 
confirms the findings that the diffusion rate has been declining since 1970, 
indicating an increase in (market and diffusion) saturation phenomena ever since. 
It should be noted that the turning points (discontinuities) in the diffusion 
rates of technological and social innovations coincide quite closely with the 
turning points of long-term "Wechsellagen" of economic growth as identified by 
a number of long wave researchers (Marchetti, 1980; van Duijn, 1983; Vasko, 
1987). The resulting peaks (i.e. the maxima in the rate of socio-technical change 
and the onset of leveling-off and saturation phenomena) occurred in 1840, 1912 
and 1970, respectively. Troughs (maxima of saturation periods and the slow 
begin of a new phase of accelerated socio-technical change) occurred in 1820, 
1875 and 1930. It is certainly not incidental that these troughs coincide with 
pronounced recession, even depression, periods in the economic development 
of the USA. 
The diffusion history of a larger number of processes of technical, 
economic and social change presented above points to an essentially 
Schumpeterian view of long-term development. Major economic expansion 
periods appear driven by the widespread diffusion of a host of interrelated 
innovations, a "technology cluster", leading to new products, markets, new 
industries and infrastructures. These diffusion processes are sustained (in fact 
contingent) by mediating social and organizational diffusion processes. The 
growth (diffusion) of a dominant "cluster" can not however be sustained 
indefinitely. Market saturation, the dwindling improvement possibilities of existing 
process technologies, managerial and organizational settings, and an increasing 
awareness of the negative (e.g environmental) externalities involved in the further 
perusal and extension of the dominant growth regime pave the way to a "season 
of saturations". During such periods opportunities arise for the introduction of 
new technological, organizational and social solutions, some of which may have 
been latently already in existence but were barred from "market entry" due to the 
dorr~inance of the previous "growth paradigm". Even when such innovations are 
introduced successfully, their penetration rates in the initial phase of their 
diffusion life cycle are rather slow and a matching new social and economic 
mediatirlg context has still to emerge. This perpetuates the period of phase 
transition where the old is saturating and the new is still embryonic. It is only 
after such a period of transition, crisis and mismatch that a new prolonged period 
of widespread diffusion of a new socio-technical "bandwagon" and thus a period 
of prolonged growth becomes possible. 
The picture that emerges from our phenomenological approach is that the 
overall development trajectory appears punctuated by crises that emerge in the 
transition from an old saturating cluster to a new but yet uncertain development 
path. As such, diffusion and its discontinuities may be one of the inherent 
features of the evolutionary process that governs social behavior. 
Conclusion: Technology and the Environment 
From a historical perspective, changes in technologies and techniques (forms of 
organization, institutions, policies) have been instrumental in raising productivity, 
resulting material output, but also in alleviating many adverse environmental 
impacts. In a nutshell, "it is technology, above all, that has denied or forestalled 
the original Malthusian vision of population outrunning subsistence. Mankind has 
been able to modify and increase the size of its niche and sustain increasing 
populations at higher levels of economic well-being. That niches keep changing, 
through the introduction of new technologies, and that we can change them are 
too commonly overlooked." (Ausubel et a/., 1989). 
What is then the role of technology in expanding and in creating new 
niches for human activities and sustenance and addressing environmental 
problems? We see three principal roles of technology: (1) as source for 
overcoming resource and environmental limits to human activities on one side 
and as a resulting (indirect) source of environmental problems on the other, (2) 
as a possible remedy to environmental problems,17 and finally, (3) as an 
(microscopic and macroscopic) instrument of observation, aiding to identify (new) 
environmental problems. 
The dynarr~ics of change identkfied in this paper give reason to be 
cautiously optimistic. Provided appropriate incentives and policies are in place to 
nurture the development of environmentally more benign technologies and their 
diffusion, many clia~iges could be irr~pleniented over a time franie of two to three 
decades. However, there will also be areas where changes will be much slower, 
particularly in the fields of long lived struct~~res of our built environment: the 
housing stock and the infrastructures for transport and energy. Here rates of 
change and diffusion constants of several decades to up to a century are typical 
and will be costly to accelerate. Therefore also the efficiency of use of existing 
systems begs attention. 
There are two strategies in response to environmental challenges: the first 
focusses on incremental changes and environmental "add-on" (end-of-pipe) 
technologies. Such policies can bring changes comparatively fast, however tend 
to reinforce the dominant trajectory, blocking more systemic (and radical) 
changes. A second strategy opts for more radical departures 
from existing technologies and practices. However such strategies - although 
more effective in the long run - require much niore time to implement because 
of the multiplicity of forward and backwards linkages between technologies, 
infrastr~~ctures and forms of organization for their production and use. Policy 
changes arid diffusion of new forms of organizational, particularly to address the 
increasing importance of diffuse sources of environmental pollution from a myriad 
of end uses, will be instrumental. 
How call the progress on moving towards a new "green" technological 
trajectory be shepherded and monitored in view of the multitude of charlges 
required at all levels of society and its economy from R&D, production to end- 
use? Local and regional and global environmental quality needs to be monitored, 
and technology is certainly a key to improve both scientific understanding and 
timeliness and policy relevance of information collected. 
170n this "paradox of technological development" cf. Gray, 1989. 
As regards technology policy, this paper has illustrated the importance of 
interlinkages and interdependencies forming whole families and clusters of 
technologies. Thus, technology policy will have to try to enhance synergies and 
interlinkages between individual technologies that eventually might yield similar 
cluster effects as the marriage of coal with the steam engine or of oil with the 
internal corr~bustion engine. As long as these interlinkages are not in place, even 
ambitious diffusion oriented policies for the promotion of individual technologies 
are unlikely to work. As a simple illustration consider just the recurrent interest 
into electric cars, the diffusion of which however, is constrained by bottlenecks 
from the energy storage media like battery technology. 
However, as illustrated in Nakicenovic's contribution to this conference, 
there are also useful macro-indicators that can serve as metric to assess in a 
more generic way the progress towards an environmentally more compatible 
future. Indicators of material, energy and emission intensities for the economy as 
a whole and for different economic and human activities (including end-uses) can 
help to guide further progress in dematerialization and decarbonization of human 
activities. 
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Figures 
Figure 1. Diffusion of Cistercian monasteries in Europe: the first 100 years. Data 
source: Janauschek, 1877. 
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Figure 2. Saptial diffusion of Cistercian set,tlements (lines of Clairveaux and 
Morirnond). Source: Donkin, 1978. 
Figure 3. Spatial spread of the railway network in the USA. Source: adapted from 
Lord and Lord, 1953, and Morill, 1970. 
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Figure 4. The diffusion process in time and space. Source: adapted from Morril, 
1968. 
Figure 5. Technological variety in response to an environmental and risk hazard: 
examples of patents for smoke spark arresters for wood burning steam 
locomotives. Source: Basalla, 1988. 
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Figure 6. Resistance to technology as a diffusion process. Number of threshing 
;nachines attacked during the Captain Swing movement in England in 1830. Note 
in particular the speed of the spread of this manifestation of social opposition. 
Data source: Hobsbawn and Rude, 1968. 
Figure 7. Growth of the canal network in operation in the USA. Source: Grubler, 
1990. 
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Figure 8. Growth of infrastructures in the USA (in percent of maxim~~m network 
size). Source: Nakicenovic, 1991. 
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Figure 9. Number of draft animals and automobiles, data and estimates derived 
from a logistic substitution model. Sol-~rce: Nakicenovit, 1986. 
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Figure 10. Diffusion of cars with first emission controls and of catalytic converter 
cars, USA, in fractional shares of total car fleet, logit (log[f/l-f]) transformation. 
Source: Nakicenovic, 
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Figure 11. Passenger car diffusion at the global level: catch-up, but at lower 
adoption levels. Es,timated saturation levels of car density (cars per 1000 
population) and diffusion rates (At's) as a function of the introduction date of the 
automobile. Source: Grubler, 1990. 
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Figure 12. Process technology change in USA steel manufacture, in fractional 
share of raw steel tonnage produced. Source: Nakicenovic, 1987. 
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Figure 13. Changes in the final energy carrier mix used in USA steel industry. 
Source: Grubler, 1992. 
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Figure 14. Specific carbon emissions versus total sector emissions for USA steel 
industry. Note in particular the functional of a learning curve i f1 the improvement 
of specific emissions (decarbonization). Source: Grijbler, 1992. 
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Figure 16. Histogram of diffusion rates, measured by At for two samples of 1 17, 
and 265 diffusion histories in the USA. Source: Griibler, 1990, and 1991. 
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Figure 17. Average diffusion rate of a sample of 117 processes of technological, 
economic and social change in the USA. Source: Grijbler, 1990 and 1991. 
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Figure 18. Weighted (by mean At) average diffusion rate of two samples of 117 
and 265 processes of technological, economic and social change in the USA. 
Source: Griibler, 1 990 and 1991 . 
